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Abstract:  This paper examines the welfare implications of an existence of free trade agreements (FTAs) 
and customs unions (CUs) in the GATT system, in the presence of cross-foreign ownership among 
countries. In particular, two GATT regimes are analyzed: a pure GATT regime without any regional free 
trade agreements, and modified GATT regime with either an FTA or a CU. This paper argues that, when 
foreign ownership exists significantly between the countries, no countries in the GATT have an incentive 
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     Multilateralism and regionalism have coexisted since the 1940s, when third world 
countries formed regional free trade agreements in response to developed countries' 
formation of GATT. Even now that the World Trade Organization (WTO) includes 
almost all nations in the world, a second wave of regionalism has emerged since the 
mid 1980s as a result of the slow progress of GATT. The coexistence of these two 
main world trade systems has important implications for both the benefits and costs of 
trade liberalization. In particular, this paper addresses the following two issues on 
regionalism. 
     First, the historical feature of trade agreements comes from the inclusion of 
contradictory articles in GATT. The heart of GATT is found in Article I, the so-called 
MFN clause, which requires that a trade concession granted to one member country 
must be granted to all other member countries on the basis of non-discrimination. At 
the same time, however, the multilateral trade agreement also specified exceptions to 
MFN in Article XXIV by allowing member countries to form regional trade 
agreements, as long as they facilitate world trade and do not raise barriers to trade 
with the rest of the world. Nearly all members of GATT are in some regional trade 
agreements. To date, 143 regional trade agreements have been notified to GATT, of 
which 82 are still in effect
1. Hence, a central issue concerning regional trade 
agreements is their compatibility with the multilateral trade agreement. 
     Second, the emergence of such regional free trade agreements also generates 
incentives for non-member countries to penetrate the trading blocs markets by 
establishing new plants and serve them with goods produced within, i.e., via foreign 
                                                 
1 For more detail, see WTO homepage, www.wto.org/wto/develop/webrtas.htm and Bhagwati and 
Panarariya (1996). The numbers include both the creation of new regional agreements and the entry of 
an additional country to an existing regional agreement.   1
direct investment (FDI). For example, Portugal and Spain, after participation in the 
European Union (EU), benefited significantly from inflow of FDI. In expectation of 
launching the North America Free Trade A greement (NAFTA), multinational 
enterprises from Japan and countries in Europe such as Germany, Sweden, etc. made 
a large amount of FDI in the NAFTA. On the other hand, it has been also true that the 
RTA-member countries continued to invest abroad where they can find any benefits 
due to either market size or locational advantages. For example, U.S. and many 
developed countries have kept on investing directly throughout all over the world. In 
short, inflows and outflows of FDI are now commonly observed. Hence, it seems very 
interesting to consider both foreign direct investment and the formation of regional 
free trade agreements. 
     The literature on the economics of integration which was initiated by Viner (1950) 
and developed by many researchers such as K emp and Wan (1976); Kennan and 
Riezman (1990); Krugman (1991), etc. has been mainly focused on impact of trading 
blocs formation on the pattern of tariff and welfare in general. More recently, 
researchers such as Richardson (1993, 1995); Bond and Syropoulos (1995); Bond, 
Syropoulos and Winters (1996); and Bagwell and Staiger (1997a, 1997b, 1999) 
started to distinguish the impact of different types of regional trade agreements such 
as free trade areas (FTAs) and customs unions (CUs). More interestingly, they 
investigated the important factors such as the impact on non-member countries' tariff 
and welfare and the role of enforcement of trade agreements. 
     However, none of them have raised a question of relationships between foreign 
direct investment and regional trade agreements. Very recently, a couple of 
researchers such as Olarreaga (1998) and Donnenfeld (2000) have begun to note the 
importance of foreign direct investment in economics of integrations. Olarreaga   2
(1998) considers the level of external tariff of regional trading member when foreign 
direct investment exists within the region. He supports a view that regional trade 
agreement attracts foreign direct investment, which was also argued by Either (1998) 
whose framework was more complicated but more generalized. Donnenfeld (2000) 
considers the choices of a firm in non-member country from two options such as 
export or investment, and tries to determine optimal external tariff when FDI is 
present. However their works did not distinguish the differences between FTAs and 
CUs and have focused on only RTA-members' welfare and tariff when inflow of FDI 
exists. This paper further extends their view to see interaction between FDI and the 
formation of regional trade agreements such as both FTA and CU in a framework 
where RTA-members and non RTA-members are cooperating over tariffs within 
multilateral trade institutions such as GATT. 
     In the model employed in this paper, there are two main noticeable factors. First, 
foreign direct investment is modeled as a f raction of foreign product endowments 
within a country. When the fraction is zero, it means that there is no foreign owned 
product due to FDI. When it is equal to one, it implies that there is no domestic owned 
product, but all products are produced by foreign firms. However, this paper does not 
consider any endogenous determination of the fraction of FDI. Rather it is an 
exogenously given parameter. It makes the analysis simple and tractable to explore 
the impact of changes of the FDI on trade and welfare. Second, trade is based on 
comparative advantage and occurs among three symmetric countries. The import 
market of each country is served by competing exporters from its two trading 
partners. The model allows for cooperation to be enforced under the two GATT 
regimes. A pure GATT is a MFN-based multilateral trade system without exceptions 
and a modified GATT is one with exceptions. The exceptions can be the formation of   3
either a Free Trade Area (FTA) or a Customs Union (CU) between two countries. An 
FTA is characterized as one in which the external tariffs are set unilaterally by each of 
the members and a CU is characterized as one in which they are set jointly by both 
parties. 
     These two forms of regional trade agreement bring about a difference in 
bargaining power among member countries in GATT. The bargaining power of a 
country in a CU is stronger than that of a country in an FTA since the two markets 
within a CU react to the rest of the world as if they are one. Such differences in 
bargaining power address the biased benefits and costs of deviation from multilateral 
tariff cooperation. Moreover the existence of FDI would affect the bargaining power 
over tariffs between RTA-members and non-RTA-members. That is, when FDI is 
present across all countries, the preservation of regional trade agreements affects the 
ability of countries to pursue the MFN-based multilateral cooperation. 
     Given this structure of trade and foreign ownership, two questions are made. First, 
can the exceptions to MFN improve both world welfare and the welfare of exempted 
member countries? Second, based on the results, to what extent can one tell about the 
design of GATT-Article XXIV?  
     The insights of the main results in this paper are as follows. (1) When an FTA does 
not achieve the highest global welfare the FTA is also bad for the individual members 
regardless of the size of the foreign ownership. Therefore, they will not support the 
FTA in the modified GATT regime. (2) When a CU does not achieve the highest 
global welfare, the CU is also bad for the individual members if the size of foreign 
ownership is significant. Therefore, they will not support the CU in the modified 
regime. (3) However, even when a CU does not achieve the highest global welfare, 
the CU is good for the individual members if the size of foreign ownership is   4
negligible. Therefore, they will support the CU in the modified regime. (4) Hence, 
although GATT-Article XXIV allows both FTA and CU, if all countries in the GATT 
already have operated international production through FDI, then no pair of countries 
are willing to form any type of a regional trade agreement within the current GATT 
system. 
     The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces a static model in 
which three goods are traded among three symmetric countries. Section 3 and 4 
explore cooperative tariffs and their welfare implications under a pure and modified 
GATT system, respectively. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2 The Static Model
2 in the Presence of Foreign Ownership 
 
     A basic structure is a simple, partial equilibrium exchange economy with three 
symmetric countries and three homogenous goods. Three countries are denoted by A, 
B, and  C, and three goods by  a,  b and  c. Each country demands the three goods 
( p p D b a - = ) (  for each goods) and is endowed with 3/2 units of each of the two 
export goods.  
     Let’s assume that the goods in an exporting industry of a country are partially 
owned by the other foreign competing country. l is a parameter that indicates the 
share of the product endowment owned by a foreign competing country. When l=0, it 
implies that there is no foreign ownership in a country and when l=1, all products in a 
country are totally owned by a foreign competing country. The profit functions for an 
industry of a country are therefore (1-l)(3p/2) in domestic and  ) 2 / 3 (
* p l  abroad.  
                                                 
2 It is a modified version of a static model developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) so as to include a 
presence of cross-foreign ownership. See their paper for more details in its absence.   5
     Each country imports a single good from the other two countries. The markets are 
perfectly competitive. The price of a good in each of the three countries must be such 
that agents cannot make profits by buying in one country and selling in another 
country for a higher price. If arbitrage opportunities exist the markets are not in 
equilibrium.  
     In this set up, each country chooses its own tariffs against the two exporters in 
order to maximize its own welfare, which is simply the sum of consumer surplus, 
producer surplus and tariff revenues. The welfare function of country  } , , { C B A I ˛  is 
given by: 
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i ” a good that corresponds to the lower case value of I (e.g., if i=A, then i=a).   
L(I) ” a country notation for a “Left-hand” trading partner of importing country I . 
R(I) ”  for a “Right-hand” partner. 
l(I) ” a export good notation for “left-hand” trading partner of exporting country I.  
r(I) ” for a “right-hand” partner.  
I
i p  (
) (I L
i p , 
) (I R
i p ) ”  the country I’s (L(I)’s, R(I)’s) local price for good i  
) (I L
i t  (
) (I R
i t ) ” the country I’s specific tariff on imports of good i from its “Left-hand” 
(“Right-hand”) trading partner.  
) (I l P ” the total surplus of exporters of good l(I).   6
) (I L
i E   ” the volume of export of  L(I), which is equal to the volume of import from 
L(I). 
 
     Differentiating (1) with respect to 
) (I L
i t  and 
) (I R
i t  and setting the derivatives equal 
to zero, the best response functions for country I are as follows: 
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     (2) shows the existence of a complementary relationship between the two imports 
tariffs. This effect was first demonstrated by Bagwell and Staiger (1999). For 
example, take country  A. Then, observe that, as A’s tariff on the import of a from B 
falls (rises), it becomes more attractive for country  A to lower (raise) the tariff on 
import of  a from  C. This is the result of three reinforcing effects: (a) A higher 
C
a t  
leads to a higher domestic prices for good a, which in turn implies that the consumer 
surplus cost of an increase in 
B
a t  is lower. (b) A higher 
C
a t  leads to an increase in 
imports volume from  B, which in turn implies that the increase in tariff revenue 
associated with an increase in 
B
a t  is higher. (c) With a higher 
C
a t , the increase in tariff 
revenue associated with the increase in imports volume from  C due to the increase in 
B
a t  is higher. 
     From the best response functions in (2), the Nash tariffs are  b t t 8 / 3





With (1), a country’s welfare is negatively affected by a tariff on its exports, but 
positively affected by a tariff on its competitor’s exports. The overall impact of an   7
importing country’s tariff on exporting country welfare is negative, leading to a 
negative externality on all its trading partners. Efficiency (maximizing the sum of all 
three countries’ welfare functions) requires free trade. The Nash equilibrium involves 
too much protection. Countries are therefore faced with a Prisoner’s Dilemma 
problem due to the negative externality.  
     Note that the best response function in (2) is independent of the parameter l. This 
implies two things. First, each country’s optimal tariffs are independent of the size of 
foreign ownership. Second, the tariff complementarity is also independent of it. 
However, the next subsection will show that the tariff complementarity may be 
affected by the size of foreign ownership, in particular, in the case of customs unions.  
 
2.1 Nash Tariffs in the Presence of a Free Trade Agreement between A and B 
 
     Consider first the impact of a free trade agreement (FTA) between country A and B 
on external tariffs chosen by each country in the Nash equilibrium. The relevant 
utility maximization problems  for FTA members and non-FTA members are as 
follows.  
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     Comparing multilateral tariffs in the presence of the FTA between  A and  B to 
multilateral tariffs in its absence, C’s tariff choices are unaffected by the FTA, but A 
and B choose to reduce their external tariffs as a result of the formation of the FTA.   8
This implies that countries that eliminate tariffs against imports from a subset of their 
trading partners preferentially will be  willing in a Nash equilibrium to liberalize 
external tariffs against their remaining trading partners as well. Note also that the 
optimal tariffs in the presence of the FTA are independent of the size of foreign 
ownership.  
     Next, compare each individual country’s welfare change in the presence and 
absence of the FTA. The changes in each country’s welfare under the Nash 
equilibrium following the FTA between A and B are such that; 
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     Suppose that l=0, which indicates a case that no country has foreign ownership in 
other countries. Now, consider welfare changes in FTA member country  A (or  B). 
Due to the bilateral eliminations of their internal tariffs, the prices in the importing 
sectors decrease and the prices in the exporting sectors increase. So the consumers’ 
surplus in the importing sector and the producers’ surplus in exporting sector will 
increase. The overall impact of the FTA on the individual members’ welfare is 
positive. Now suppose that l>0, which indicates a case that, for instance, a product b 
in  A is owned by C partially, and the product b in  C is also owned by  A partially.   9
Given such trade flow and ownership structure, suppose that countries A and B form 
an FTA. Then the bilateral removal of tariff between A and B benefits each other only 
partially. The benefit from the FTA is not fully delivered to the FTA members when 
products are owned by countries that are not the part of the FTA region. Such an 
agreement will benefit country C through the ownership in A. When  l is greater than 
some critical level, the welfare level of FTA members becomes smaller. 
     As for the welfare change in country C, due to the strong complementary reduction 
of the external tariffs, the prices in the two exporting sectors increase. So the welfare 
of country C will increase as well. Moreover, if l>0, then there will be an additional 
welfare gain from its exporting sectors associated with the FTA. The more the 
ownership by country  C in countries  A and  B where internal tariffs are zero, the 
greater the producer’s surplus in the two exporting sectors in the FTA region. 
 
2.2 Nash Tariffs in the Presence of a Customs Union between A and B 
 
     Consider next the impact of a customs union (CU) between country A and B on 
external tariffs chosen by each country in the Nash equilibrium. The relevant utility 
maximization problems for CU members and non-CU members are as follows.  
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     Comparing multilateral tariffs in the presence of the CU between  A and  B to 
multilateral tariffs in its absence, the results are similar to the case of the FTA.   10
However, the complementary reduction of the external tariff becomes stronger in the 
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. This is because, as the size of foreign ownership increases within the 
CU, members of a customs union are less concerned about the negative externality 
imposed on other customs union members when they lower their external tariff. The 
reduction of the external tariff in a union member country will reduce the relative 
export price in the other union member country. However, this would not hurt the 
other members when the product is owned by third country.  
     Comparing each country’s welfare in the presence of the CU between A and B to 
the welfare in its absence, the levels depend on the size of foreign ownership as 
follows. 
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For country C,  
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     As for the welfare change in CU member country A (or B), a customs union has the 
same result as a free trade agreement. Suppose that l=0. They will have an incentive 
to form a customs union in the Nash equilibrium. However, when l is high enough,   11
they will lose such an incentive in the Nash equilibrium. As for the welfare change in 
country C, when l is 0, due to the weak complementary reduction of external tariff of 
CU members, welfare of country C will be hurt by the formation of the CU. However, 
country  C will gain as  l is high enough. That is, if non-CU member country  C 
partially owns goods a in B, and b in A then, when A and B forms a CU, the formation 
of CU benefits country C as well through the ownership within the CU. The benefits 
will be greater as country C owns more of a and b within the CU. 
     In the next section 3 and 4, this paper begins to consider multilateral tariff 
cooperation among three countries with common discount rates
3. In the dynamic 
game, the three countries agree to cooperate until there is some deviation. If any 
country deviates, they all revert to playing their Nash tariffs forever. This repeated 
game can lead to subgame perfect equilibrium that involves cooperation and avoid the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma situation demonstrated in the static game. To see the 
consequences of the existence of regional trade agreements in the multilateral tariff 
cooperation, two types of dynamic regimes are compared. The first regime will be 
called a pure GATT regime that does not allow for regional trade agreements. The 
second regime will be called a modified GATT regime that allows them. In the latter 
GATT regime two cases are examined: one where only an FTA is allowed and the 
other where only a CU is allowed.  
 
 
3 A Pure GATT Regime without Regional Trade Agreements 
                                                 
3 This analysis is different from Bagwell and Staiger (1999)’s dynamic model.  While they assume that, 
among three countries, two countries have a common high discount rate, and one country has a low 
discount rate; all three countries are assumed to have a common discount rate. This modification 
enables me to rank the individual country’s welfare for a case where no pair of countries forms a 
regional trade agreement (section 3) and the other where two countries A and B form a regional trade 
agreement (section 4).   12
 
     Let’s consider a pure GATT regime in which the three countries, A, B, and C, are 
forced to impose non-discriminatory tariffs on imports of the same good from all their 
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} , , { C B A I ˛ , which means that an importing country is not allowed to set a 
discriminatory tariff rate. The multilateral agreement consists of a set of tariffs 
) , , ( ) ( ) ( I r I l i t t t , the lowest that can be supported by the threat of infinite Nash 
reversion. Due to the symmetry of model, the lowest cooperative tariffs are such that 
) ( ) ( I r I l i t t t = = . 
     The per period benefit of deviating from these tariffs is given by the difference 
between the welfare obtained by deviation to the optimal tariffs and that obtained by 
cooperating. That is: 
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N t  is the best response (Nash) tariffs. Recall that there is a dominant strategy 
in tariffs or, in other words, the best response tariff does not depend on the tariffs 
charged by other countries. The benefit of deviating is characterized by two main 
properties. The first is that, the lower the cooperative tariff is, the higher the benefit of 
deviating. The second is that, when there is no cooperation, the benefit of deviating is 
zero. The benefit of deviating must be compared to the cost of Nash reversion. The 
per period cost of the deviation is: 
   13
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     The cost of deviation is increasing in a country’s own cooperative tariff and 
decreasing in other countries’ cooperative tariff. This is a result of the fact that higher 
tariffs of the country lead to increased tariff revenue and lower tariffs on the country’s 
export goods lead to higher producer’s surplus. Due to the symmetry in the 
cooperative equilibrium, the cost of deviation can be rewritten as a function of a 
symmetric cooperative tariff. The cost of deviation is decreasing in the symmetric 
cooperative tariffs since the increased tariff revenue in an import sector of a country is 
dominated by the decreased producer’s surplus in the two export sectors of the 
country.  
     Now the incentive constraint faced by a country under the pure GATT regime is: 
 
(7)     









where  d is a discount rate for all countries. Let’s define an equilibrium non-
discriminatory tariff 
GATT pure t  as the lowest tariff that satisfies (7). As d  increases 
from 0 to 1, the discounted c ost of the deviation increases and thus the lowest 
cooperative tariff rate that satisfies the incentive constraint decreases. Solving (7) for 
the lowest symmetric cooperative tariff with equality yields: 
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      Proposition 1 summarizes the consequences of the pure GATT regime. 
 
Proposition 1  When  ] 1 , 5714285 . 0 [ ˛ d , the pure GATT regime can achieve free 
trade and maximum global welfare.  
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     The results in proposition 1 will be compared to the case of the modified GATT 
regime with an FTA and a CU, respectively.  
 
 
4 Modified GATT Regimes with Regional Trade Agreements 
 
4.1 A Free Trade Agreement between A and B 
 
     This section assumes that countries  A and  B  formed an FTA and sees its 
consequences on multilateral tariffs and welfare. The parameter of foreign ownership, 
l, will be carefully considered within the model. 
     Within the FTA, countries  A and  B trade two goods  a and  b without duties 




a t t ). The symmetry between them i mplies that they will impose a 
symmetric multilateral tariff on imports from their external trading country (C), which 





e t t t = ” . Under the reversion to the Nash equilibrium, the FTA 
between them remains intact, and so the Nash punishment tariffs (dominant strategies)   15








a t b t t t t ” = = = = 22 / 3 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( . Finally, country 
C will continue to abide by the non-discrimination principle under the multilateral 




c t t t ” = . Country C’s best response tariff continues to be 
b t 8 / 3 =
N
c .  
     To obtain the lowest cooperative tariffs in the presence of the FTA, incentive 
constraints for each country are constructed. The per period of benefit and cost of 
deviation from an agreed-upon tariff for a member in the FTA, given  c t , are: 
 
(9)     






) , ; , 0 ; , 0 ( ) , ; , 0 ; , 0 (




e N FTA FTA W W G
t t b t t
t t t t t t t t
- - - =
- =
 
(10)   






2 9 ) ) ( ) ((
9
5
) , ; , 0 ; , 0 ( ) , ; , 0 ; , 0 (













e e FTA FTA W W L
t t b t t t t l t t b
t t t t t t t t




     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by an FTA member, the higher the 
benefit to  deviate. The lower the given tariffs ( c t ) by the non-FTA member, the 
higher the cost of deviation. However, the cost is the functions of not only 
e t  but also 
N
t . Only when  b l b 20 / ) 9 2 ( 3 22 / 3 - < , the lower the cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by an 
FTA member, the lower the cost of deviation. Otherwise, it depends on the size of l. 
     Non-member country C’s benefit and cost of the deviation are: 
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(12) 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-FTA country, the 
higher the benefit to deviate and the lower the cost of deviation. However, the cost 
depends on the size of  l. Only when  b l b 8 / ) 9 2 ( 3 22 / 3 - < , the lower the 
cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by an FTA member, the lower the cost of deviation.  
     The incentive constraints of each of the members and non-member are: 
 
(13)     







(14)     








Lemma 1 When zero tariffs are imposed on the incentive constraints (13) and (14) 
respectively, 
FTA d d ‡  and 
nonFTA d d ‡ , such that 
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     The proposition 2 summarizes the consequences of the existence of the FTA 
within the GATT.    17
 
Proposition 2 When  ] , 7 / 4 [
nonFTA d d˛  for the range of  ) 99 / 20 , 0 [ ˛ l , the modified 
GATT regime with an FTA cannot achieve free trade. Specifically, FTA member 
countries will choose zero external tariffs and the non-FTA member country will 
choose positive tariffs. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     This proposition shows a possibility that free trade cannot be achievable even if the 
discount rate is 1
4. According to proposition 1, for that range of the discount rates, the 
pure GATT regime can achieve free trade. However, when there is an FTA in the 
GATT, proposition 2 p roves that the non-FTA member country chooses positive 
tariffs while FTA countries keep setting zero tariffs. This is because of the 
complementary reduction of external tariff. That is, the formation of the FTA makes 
the FTA members choose the smaller optimal external tariffs. Then, this works to 
reduce the non-member country’s cost of deviation since the level of retaliation by the 
FTA member decreases. So, the non-member country is capable of increasing its 
cooperative tariffs. 
     Next proposition 3 shows the welfare implications of the set of lowest cooperative 
tariffs. In particular, a country’s ranking of the GATT regime will be affected by the 
formation of the free trade agreement. 
 
Proposition 3  When  ] , 7 / 4 [
nonFTA d d˛  for the range of  ) 99 / 20 , 0 [ ˛ l , the FTA 
member countries prefer the pure GATT regime, but the non-FTA member country 
                                                 
4 As the l approaches to 20/99, 
nonFTA d  will be infinite, which is greater than 1. 
   18
prefers the modified GATT regime. The global welfare under the modified GATT 
regime with the FTA is smaller than under the pure GATT regime. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     Intuitively, when the non-FTA member sets the positive tariffs against the FTA 
member countries, it will hurt the export sector within the FTA, while the tariffs 
protect the import sector of the non-FTA member country so the welfare will increase. 
Moreover global welfare is not maximized due to the positive tariffs. These results 
imply that, when the FTA does not achieve the maximum global welfare, it is also bad 
for the FTA member country’s welfare. Therefore they will not support the FTA in 
the modified GATT regime. Rather they prefer the pure GATT regime. 
 
4.2 Customs Union between A and B 
 
     This section repeats the same analysis as above, but for a different regional trade 
agreement, a customs union (CU), between a pair of countries, A and B. Unlike an 
FTA in which an external tariff of one country is independent of that of the other, 
countries in a CU are coordinating their trade policies. 
     Let’s assume that countries  A and  B  formed a customs union and see the 
consequences of the CU on multilateral tariffs and each country’s welfare and world 
welfare. As in the previous section, the parameter of foreign ownership, l, will be 
carefully considered within the model. 
     Within the CU, countries  A and  B trade two goods  a and  b without duties 




a t t ). The symmetry between them implies that they will impose a 
symmetric multilateral tariff on imports from their external trading country (C), which   19





e t t t = ” . Under the reversion to the Nash equilibrium, the CU 
between them remains intact, and so the Nash punishment tariffs (dominant strategies) 











20 / ) 9 2 ( 3 ) 0 ( ) 0 ( t b l t t t t ” - = = = = . The 
Nash external tariff chosen by CU member countries is a decreasing function of l. 
When  l increases,  the external tariff will decrease. The CU between A and B will 
reduce the effectiveness with which these countries can punish C in the event C were 
to defect from the multilateral agreement. Finally, country C will continue to abide by 





c t t t ” = . Under a Nash reversion, country C’s best response tariff continues to 





     To solve the lowest cooperative tariff in the presence of CU, first, let’s consider 
per period of benefit and cost when a member in a CU deviates from agreed-upon 
tariff. 
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t t < , the lower the cooperative tariffs (
e t ) by a CU member, the 
higher the benefit to deviate and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the   20
given cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-CU member, the higher the cost of 
deviation. 
     Non-member country C’s benefit and cost of the deviation are: 
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     Note that, the lower the cooperative tariffs ( c t ) by the non-CU country, the higher 
the benefit to deviate and the lower the cost of deviation. And, the lower the given 
tariffs (
e t ) by the CU member, the higher the cost of deviation. 
     The incentive constraints of each of the members and non-member are: 
 
(19)     
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Lemma 2 When zero tariffs are imposed on the incentive constraints (19) and (20) 
respectively, 
CU d d ‡  and 
nonCU d d ‡ , such that 
       
2 ) 9 2 (
35
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l d - ”
CU ,  )









nonCU , and, for  ] 9 / 2 , 0 [ ˛ l  
      (a)  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ 7 / 4 ˛ < < l d d for
CU nonCU    21
      (b)  ] 0465401 . 0 , 0384895 . 0 [ 7 / 4 7 / 4 ˛ ‡ ‡ l d d for and
CU nonCU  
      (c)  ] 9 / 2 , 0465401 . 0 ( 7 / 4 ˛ < < l d d for
nonCU CU . 
 
     The proposition 4 summarizes the consequences of the existence of the FTA 
within the GATT.  
 
Proposition 4 
(a) When  ] , 7 / 4 [
CU d d˛  for  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ ˛ l , the modified GATT regime with a 
CU cannot achieve free trade. Specifically, CU member countries will choose positive 
external tariffs and the non-CU member country will choose zero tariffs. 
(b) When  ] , 7 / 4 [
nonCU d d˛  for  ] 9 / 2 , 0465401 . 0 ( ˛ l , the modified GATT regime 
with a CU cannot achieve free trade. Specifically, the non-CU member country will 
choose positive external tariffs and the CU member countries will choose zero tariffs. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     While proposition 1 shows that the pure GATT regime can achieve free trade, 
proposition 4 shows that free trade may or may not be achievable if the CU exists in 
the GATT. More specifically, the proposition shows two results. First, when the 
foreign ownership is negligible, i.e.,  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ ˛ l , the CU member country 
chooses positive tariffs while the non-CU countries keep setting zero tariffs. This is a 
different result from the case of FTA. This is because, first, the reduction of CU’s 
external tariffs is  not as big as that of FTAs, and second, the CU members are 
coordinating their external trade policies. On the contrary, the second result shows 
that, when the foreign ownership is not negligible, i.e.,  ] 9 / 2 , 0465401 . 0 ( ˛ l , the non   22
CU member country chooses positive tariffs while the CU countries keep setting zero 
tariffs. The reduction of CU’s external tariffs is affected by the level of foreign 
ownership. When the members have foreign endowments within the CU, they don’t 
have to be concerned about their negative externality of external tariffs. That is, the 
existence of foreign ownership within the CU works to reduce external tariffs as 
strong as in the case of the FTA. 
 
     Proposition 5 shows the welfare implications of the set of lowest cooperative 
tariffs. In particular, a country’s ranking of the GATT regime will be affected by the 
formation of the customs union. 
 
Proposition 5 
(a) When  ] , 7 / 4 [
CU d d˛  for  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ ˛ l , the CU member countries prefer the 
modified GATT regime, but the non-CU member country prefers the pure GATT 
regime. The global welfare under the modified GATT regime with the CU is smaller 
than under the pure GATT regime. 
(b) When  ] , 7 / 4 [
nonCU d d˛  for  ] 9 / 2 , 0465401 . 0 ( ˛ l , the CU member countries 
prefer the pure GATT regime, but the non-CU member country prefers the modified 
GATT regime. The global welfare under the modified GATT regime with the CU is 
smaller than under the pure GATT regime. 
Proof: See Appendix 
 
     Due to the fact the free trade cannot be achieved in this case, the global welfare is 
smaller than the case of the pure GATT regime. As to (a), when the CU member sets 
the positive tariffs against the non member country, it will hurt the export sector of the   23
non CU member country (so the level of welfare will decrease), while the tariffs 
protect the import sector of the CU member country (the level of welfare will 
increase). This result implies that, even when the CU does not achieve the maximum 
global welfare, the formation of the CU is good for the CU member country’s welfare. 
Therefore they will support the CU in the modified GATT regime. However, as to (b) 
where the foreign ownership is not negligible, the result is opposite. That is, since the 
non-CU member sets the positive tariffs against the member country, it hurts the 
export sector of the CU member country, while the tariffs protect the import sector of 
the non CU member country. In this case, when the CU does not achieve the 
maximum global welfare, the formation of the CU is also bad f or the CU member 




5 Concluding Remarks 
 
     This paper examined, in an environment where foreign ownerships exist in each of 
countries, welfare levels of an individual country  before and  after the country 
participates in a regional trade agreement within the GATT where all countries are 
supposed to abide by non-discrimination principle. The main insight of the result is 
that, there may not be any welfare gains for the  RTA member countries in the 
multilateral tariff negotiation of the GATT. This would be true, in particular, when the 
foreign ownerships exist significantly.  
     The result of this paper does not preclude a possibility of political gains of regional 
trade agreement. As Levy (1997) argued, regional free-trade agreements can   24
undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. The present 
paper, however, argued that regional trade agreements might not undermine economic 
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
The proof is very straightforward. When  d=0.5714285=4/7, the lowest cooperative 
tariff from (8) is 0. When  d>4/7, zero cooperative tariffs satisfy the incentive 
constraint of (7). So, the pure GATT system can achieve free trade. Moreover, the 
global welfare maximization problem yields zero tariffs for all countries:  
) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( 3
I W  is a maximum level of global welfare under the pure GATT regime. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
From lemma 1, for the range of  ) 99 / 20 , 0 [ ˛ l , 
nonFTA FTA d d < < 7 / 4 . This implies 
that when  ] , [
nonFTA FTA d d d˛ , free trade under the modified GATT regime with the 
FTA can not be supported. More specifically, since the discount rate for that range is 
less than 
nonFTA d , the non-FTA member will choose  c t >0, given 
e t =0, so as to 
satisfy the incentive constraint of (14). Next, from (10), 
FTA L  with 
e t =0 <  c t  is 
smaller than with 
e t =0 =  c t . Therefore, the critical discount rate for FTA member 
country to support 
e t =0 must be greater than 
FTA d  if  c t >0. Hence, when 
] , 7 / 4 [
nonFTA d d˛ , the two incentive constraints support 
e t =0 <  c t .               
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
From proposition 1 and 2, 
GATT pure t =0 and 
e t =0< c t . Then, since 
0< c t <
N
c t =
N t =3/8b, the welfare changes of an FTA member and non-FTA member 
countries are respectively: 
 




( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) , ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( < - = - c c
I
c c
FTA W W t
b
t t t  





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; , ( > - = - c c
I
c c
nonFTA W W t
b
t t t  
 
     The global welfare change is, using the above two results: 
 
      0 ] [ ] [ 2 ] 3 [ ] 2 [ < - + - = - +
I nonFTA I FTA I nonFTA FTA W W W W W W W .                 
 
Proof of Proposition 4  
(a)  For the range of  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ ˛ l , lemma 2 shows that 
CU nonCU d d < < 7 / 4 . 
This implies that when  ] , [
CU nonCU d d d˛  free trade under the modified GATT regime 
with the CU cannot be supported. More specifically, since the discount rate for that 
range is less than 
CU d , the CU member will choose 
e t >0, given  c t =0, so as to 
satisfy the incentive constraint of (19). Next, from (18), 
nonCU L  with  c t =0 < 
e t  is 
smaller than with  c t =0=
e t . Therefore, the critical discount rate for non-CU member 
country to support  c t =0 must be greater than 
nonCU d  if 
e t >0. Hence, when 
] , 7 / 4 [
CU d d˛ , the two incentive constraints support  c t =0 < 
e t .   26
 
(b) For the range of  ] 9 / 2 , 0465401 . 0 ( ˛ l , lemma 2 shows that 
nonCU CU d d < < 7 / 4 . 
This implies that when  ] , [
nonCU CU d d d˛ , free trade under the modified GATT 
regime with the CU can not be supported. More specifically, since the discount rate 
for that range is less than 
nonCU d , the non-CU member will choose  c t >0, given 
e t =0, 
so as to satisfy the incentive constraint of (20). Next, from (16), 
CU L  with 
e t =0 < c t  
is smaller than with 
e t =0= c t . Therefore, the critical discount rate for CU member 
country to support 
e t =0 must be greater than 
CU d  if  c t >0. Hence, when 
] , 7 / 4 [
nonCU d d˛ , the two incentive constraints support 
e t =0 < c t . 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
(a) When  ] , 7 / 4 [
CU d d˛  for  ) 0384895 . 0 , 0 [ ˛ l , from proposition 1 and 4, 
pureGAT t =0 and  c t =0<
e t . Then, since 0<
e t <
N ~
t = b l 20 / ) 9 2 ( 3 - , the welfare 
changes of a CU member and non-CU member countries are respectively: 
 





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) 0 , 0 ; , 0 ; , 0 ( > -
-
= -
e e I e e CU W W t
b l
t t t  





( ) 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( ) , 0 ; , 0 ; 0 , 0 ( < +
-
= -
e e I e e nonCU W W t
b l
t t t  
 
     The global welfare change is, using the above two results: 
 
      0 ] [ ] [ 2 ] 3 [ ] 2 [ < - + - = - +
I nonCU I CU I nonCU CU W W W W W W W  
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